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Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification-
The Agency Problem
Paul B. Stephan"
Any project to unify some part of the law across jurisdictions requires an
adjudicatory body to apply the unified law to transactions and transactors. The
available choices include domestic courts (which in the United States entails a further
choice between federal and state courts), private arbitration, ad hoc arbitration under
the auspices of an international organization (such as that conducted by the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes), and a permanent
international tribunal (such as the European Court of Justice, the Dispute Settlement
Body of the World Trade Organization, the International Court of Justice, or the
new International Criminal Court). Most efforts to unify law take it on faith that the
application phase will not present any significant problems, assuming that
adjudicatory bodies will honor the commands of the legislator and, where discretion
exists, will implement the underlying purpose of the unified legislation in a coherent
and transparent fashion. I argue, to the contrary, that the application phase presents
severe difficulties that will frustrate a wide range of unification projects. In particular,
any legal unification project that has substantial redistributive dimensions will face
significant obstacles, whatever the adjudicatory body chosen.
First I discuss the roles of adjudicatory bodies in promoting the unification of
law. Then I clarify the redistributive dimensions of unification projects. Working
Percy Brown, Jr. Professor and E. James Kelly, Jr.-Class of 1965 Research Professor, University of
Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to Jack Goldsmith, Paul Mahoney, Chris Sanchirico, and
John Setear for helpful comments and criticism. Responsibility for errors remains solely mine.
1. My argument, which focuses on the deficiencies of unification, complements the claim that in many
contexts, regulatory competition among diverse legal systems promotes wel&re. For elaboration on
the welfare claim, see Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The Search for Virtue, in
George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter L. Lindseth, eds, Transatlantic Regulatory
Co-Operation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects 167 (Oxford 2000). Further arguments can be found
in Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 Theoretical Inq L
387 (2001); Uriel Procaccia and Uzi Segal, Thou Sbalt Not Sow Thy Vineyard With Divers Seeds? The
Case Against the Harnonization of Private Law, available online at <http://www.econ-
pol.unisi.it/scdbanc/CONFERENZA/FILEPDF/12-Procaccia.pdf> (visited Sept 13, 2002).
CbicagoJournafof Internationa(Law
within the familiar framework of game theory as applied to international relations, I
distinguish between the coordination and defection problems that underlie most
international interactions. I argue that adjudicatory bodies have the ability to generate
solutions to some coordination problems, but face major obstacles when seeking to
implement stable solutions to others, and to many defection problems. The
difficulties vary depending on the types of adjudicatory bodies involved, but each type
has its own drawbacks. I offer examples from a range of current unification projects-
carriage of goods, antitrust, and environmental law-to illustrate how application
problems can frustrate unification.
I. COURTS, TRIBUNALS, AND UNIFICATION
Translating law-on-the-books into law-in-practice requires a mechanism to
implement the prescribed rules. Certainly some rule internalization takes place
without any need for enforcement, but doubts over the rules' meanings and the
occurrence of operative facts usually arise and demand attention. No international
legal unification project has avoided the need to rely on some kind of adjudication,
whether it employs a system especially designed for the project or commandeers a
preexisting system such as national courts.
The responsibilities, and therefore the scope of the authority, of adjudicatory
bodies vary. At a minimum, some body must resolve disputes over the application of
accepted rules to contested facts. Certain kinds of international commercial
arbitration do only this. The typical arbitration tribunal provides a definitive
resolution of the dispute before it, but does not make its decision available to the
general public. At a maximum, the dispute resolving body may have the responsibility
not only to apply the rules, but to create them. Admiralty and antitrust law in the
United States are cases in point. The federal courts have regarded themselves as
possessing a mandate to develop a common law governing these subjects, a license
they have exercised vigorously. Adjudicatory bodies normally operate in a range
between these two extremes, generating different amounts of additional information
about the law they apply as well as determining the outcomes of specific disputes.
When seeking to achieve some coherence in the laws of multiple jurisdictions,
the reformer must consider whether the project's ambition includes unified
application, as opposed to unified expression. Many of the twentieth centurys state-
based commercial law unification projects-the Hague Rules on bills of lading in sea
transport, the Warsaw Convention on contracts of carriage by air, the New York
Convention on Commercial Arbitration, the New York Convention on International
Sale of Goods, as well as the various proposed model laws of the United Nation's
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")-leave it to national
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courts to apply the laws.' Similarly, most international efforts to harmonize regulation
of commerce involve informal coordination among administrative agencies without
any judicial participation. Thus the European Community ("EC") and the US Justice
Department have a written agreement to coordinate their antitrust enforcement
efforts, but nothing in this accord binds their courts. National securities market
regulators cooperate less formally through their participation in the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), but again their actions do not
involve their courts.
What seems to be the dominant model of national judicial sovereignty-what I
will call the dispersion approach-comes at a cost to unification, especially in those
instances where the unified law leaves significant discretion to the court. Accordingly,
other strategies have emerged in fields where transactors or lawmakers desire greater
degrees of legal predictability across national borders. Commercial arbitration under
the auspices of an established facility, such as the International Chamber of
Commerce, has become the default process for resolving a wide range of banking,
sales, and shipping disputes. Another strategy involves transactors precommitting to
dispute resolution by a particular jurisdiction's courts, thereby converting one nation's
law into a de facto unified international standard. Because both arbitration and
jurisdiction-by-choice depend on the disputants' contractual relationship, however,
neither option helps to unify the law governing nonconsensual transactions, whether
the imposition of regulatory restrictions by a government or the rules dealing with
third-party effects.
If dispersion of adjudicatory authority is a problem, the logical solution would
seem to be submission of disputes to a single decisionmaking system, what I will call
the centralized approach. We do encounter instances where, in the regulation of
nonconsensual transactions, states have placed national decisionmakers under binding
international oversight. For example, the European Court of Justice, a treaty-based
international body, determines whether member states have complied with the
community's directives, a form of legal unification that requires national legislation to
implement community-determined law. More recently, the Dispute Settlement Body
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), another treaty-based body, has begun to
supervise the compliance of member states with substantive legal unification
commitments, particularly those embodied in the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") Agreement. A proposal in the current round of
multilateral trade negotiations would extend this oversight to antitrust law.
2. In the case of the United States, adoption of the commercial law conventions does advance a more
limited form of unification, namely nationwide uniformity in the form of federal law. These
conventions in some instances supplant state law, over which the Supreme Court has no supervisory
power.
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The centralized approach has a basic institutional structure that remains the
same across substantive goals. In the case of both the EC and WTO, a standing
international tribunal, at the behest of a range of public actors (in the case of the EC,
Community organs and the member states; in the case of the WTO, the member
states), ascertains whether a country has complied with its obligation to unify its
substantive law.' Each tribunal has sanctioning authority to coerce compliance with its
rulings, although neither has as great an array of coercive tools as a typical national
court.
The centralized approach to unification should reduce the dispersion of
outcomes and interpretations and thus promote unification. But, using the vocabulary
of the law and economics literature, international adjudicatory bodies entail
substantial agency costs.4 The members of the adjudicatory bodies (the putative agent)
normally do not have strong incentives to divine and honor the wishes of the states
that gave them lawmaking authority (the putative principals). The principals, aware of
the endemic risk of disloyalty, will under-invest in such an agent. The creation of
incentives for the international agent to act as the national principals would wish-
typically through monitoring and bonding mechanisms-also entails costs. These
costs may be especially high given the structure of international decisionmaking.
Conceptually, nations creating an international adjudicatory body can choose
three strategies, each of which has drawbacks. Through bonding, nations can adopt
precise rules that significantly limit the adjudicator's discretion. Alternatively, they can
endow the adjudicatory body with the authority to decide the specific content of the
unified law. Giving this power to the adjudicatory body in turn requires a choice
between tolerating agent disloyalty-the adoption of laws that the nations would not
wish to see enacted-or costly monitoring. Mixing these strategies-bonding,
tolerating disloyalty, and monitoring-may reduce one category of costs, but always
increases others.
The bonding route means adopting a unified law that sacrifices flexibility and
adaptability for the sake of clarity. In international unification projects, giving up
flexibility presents particular disadvantages. For the project to have continuing vitality,
it must adapt to its constantly changing environment. But the nature of international
lawmaking makes it hard to do this. Sovereign states enact unified laws in one of two
ways. They may allow each nation to choose whether to adopt the law, thus giving
every state a veto over the project, or at least to choose the extent of the law.
3. In the case of the EC, private persons also can invoke Community legislation, including directives, in
civil lawsuits to challenge national law. Private parties do not have direct access to WTO dispute
settlement proceedings, but can participate indirectly by obtaining the support of one of the
participating member states.
4. The seminal discussion is Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976).
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Alternatively, as in the EC, states may choose, one-by-one, ex ante to delegate
lawmaking authority to an international body. In either case, deciding on the precise
terms of the law, or the delegation to make law, is difficult. Negotiating amendments
presents even greater challenges. Absent a means of exit from the unified legal regime,
whether formal or informal, states will regard the unified law as a status quo with
network benefits. Piecemeal changes on a state-by-state basis mean sacrificing these
benefits. Coordinated amendments involving all members will be difficult to enact due
to holdout states, at least some of which might view any departure from the status quo
as risky or otherwise welfare-reducing.
Restructuring a delegation of authority to an international body poses even
greater difficulties. The terms of the delegation might preclude piecemeal changes by
individual states, and the international agent might resist any alteration that reduces
its discretionary authority. It is instructive that organizations such as the WTO and
the EC have tended over time to acquire broader and less specific delegated authority
from their members. Instances of members making downstream constitutional
commitments to rein in an international organization are exceedingly rare.
The alternative to bonding, which is precise and therefore constrains delegations,
is to authorize the international adjudicator to implement broad principles in a
manner that it sees fit. So recast, the adjudicatory function subsumes a delegation of
lawmaking authority. In the international context, such delegations raise special
concerns. States resist blanket derogations of their authority because of the serious
risk to national authority that disloyal institutions present. Instead, they build
monitoring constraints into the institutions that receive adjudicatory power. A typical
arrangement involves limiting the tenure in the adjudicatory bodies to short terms,
with individual states determining who occupies particular slots. For example, the
justices of the European Court of Justice hold office for only six years, with a right of
renomination, and each member state selects one justice. The members of the WTO's
Appellate Body have a similar arrangement, serving for only four years!
Such short leashes make it difficult for these bodies to develop coherent
approaches to the development of new law. Knowing that they can be replaced, the
members of the tribunal have an incentive not to do anything that will upset the
countries with nominating authority. In those cases where the members nonetheless
veer off in an unanticipated direction, the nominating state can institute a course
correction within a relatively short period of time by choosing "sounder" candidates
for the tribunal. Thus one should not expect ambitious, systematic, and
comprehensive law coming from an institution endowed with the authority to develop
unified law on an international level. More likely are decisions that do not commit the
5. Similarly, the judges on the European Court of Human Rights have six-year terms. Judges on the
International Criminal Court have nine-year terms and, with one narrow exception, have no right of
renomination.
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tribunal to particular directions, perhaps punctuated by bold moves that generate
reversals more often than not.
These agency costs do not mean that international agencies as such cannot
achieve important goals, or that they cannot advance significant unification of the law.
Neither do I reject the possibility of some successful coordination that depends
exclusively on national courts for application and enforcement. In the next section I
consider the conditions for the success of both dispersive and centralized unification. I
argue that the conditions exist less frequently than is often assumed, and in particular
appear not to exist with respect to some projects already in existence or under current
consideration.
II. COORDINATION AND DEFECTION
The use of game theory to model international relations, including the
development of international law, has become commonplace.6 I will not repeat here
the discussion of the various games, their characteristics and their relevance to
particular issues. Rather I want to focus on two broad categories of games, those
involving coordination and those posing defection problems
In the international relations literature, all games begin as interactions between
two players, each with two choices.8 Chart 1 illustrates the conception. Players X and
Y choose between moves A and B, with each player receiving a payoff P that depends
on both choices. Both matches (both players choose A or B) and mismatches (one
6. A representative list of articles by international law professors includes Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric
A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 1113 (1999); John K. Setear,
Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and
Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 Va L Rev 1 (1997); David W.
Leebron, A Gaine Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational
Corporation, 60 Cin L Rev 305 (1991); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YaleJ Intl L 335 (1989).
7. Economists often limit the term "coordination game" to those "pure' games where the players have
identical preferences and prefer any match to any mismatch. In the international relations literature,
however, the term is used more generally to apply to those games where defection from a cooperative
outcome is not the dominant strategy for a single iteration. See, for example, Duncan Snidal,
Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 Am Polit
Sci Rev 923, 931-32 (1985). I will follow the political scientists' usage, hoping that any economist
reading this will make allowances for the conventional if imprecise usage. Similarly, some political
scientists characterize games where defection represents the dominant strategy in single-shot games
as presenting cooperation problems. Id. Economists, in contrast, tend to confine the term
"cooperation" to direct contacts between players outside the iteration of the game. To avoid
confusion, I will refer to these games as defection problems.
8. Game theory as such deals with more general n-player, n-choice interactions. For a defense of the 2 x
2 method, see id at 925. For a discussion of extending 2 x 2 models to n x n games, see Goldsmith
and Posner, 66 U Chi L Rev at 1129-31 (cited in note 6).
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chooses A, the other B, and vice versa) are possible. Characterization of the game
turns on the values assigned to particular Ps.
Chart 1
Player Y
Player X
Coordination problems are those in which at least one matching outcome is at
least as highly rewarded as all nonmatching outcomes. Defection problems entail
games where one nonmatching outcome is, for each player, superior to either
9. Both the "battle of the sexes" and the "stag hunt" games are examples of coordination games. Imagine
players X and Y and choices A and B. In the battle of the sexes, each player prefers all matches with
its opponent to any nonmatching outcome, but each prefers a different match. X prefers (AA) to
(B,B) [in each pair the first choice is X's, the second Y's], but prefers either of those two to (AB) or
(B,A). Y symmetrically prefers (B,B) to (A,A), but also prefers (A,A) to (A,B) or (B,A). In the stag
hunt, for each player the wrong nonmatch is the worst possible outcome, but the right nonmatch is
worse than the best match. X prefers (A,A) to all outcomes, may be indifferent between (B,A) and
(B,B) or prefers (B,A) to (B,B), and least desires (A,B), while Y prefers (A,A), but is indifferent
between (A,B) and (B,B) or prefers (A,B) to (B,B) and least prefers (B,A). An uninteresting
variation on the coordination game is coincidence of interest, where both X and Y prefer one
matching outcome ((A,A) or (BB)) to all other outcomes and prefer the other matching outcome
least. Coordination is unnecessary, as naked self-interest produces the optimal collective outcome; in
one sense this is not a game at all. For an analysis of this model in the context of international law,
see Goldsmith and Posner, 66 U Chi L Rev at 1122-23 (cited in note 6). A coordination game that
presents less complexity than either the battle of the sexes or a stag hunt, but more than a
coincidence-of-interest problem, gives equally high payoffs to each matching outcome and equally
low payoffs to each nonmatch. The players do not care about the choice, other than whether it
matches that of the other player. This is the pure coordination game as economists use the term. Id
at 1127-29.
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matching outcome.0 If we think of the games' two choices as either adherence to some
standard, or defection, defection problems are those in which successful opportunism
(defection while the other player adheres) reaps the most rewards. 1
It is conventional in international relations to begin a game theory analysis by
making two strong assumptions: that each player knows the others payoffs and that
only one play occurs. A second step involves relaxing the single shot assumption and
analyzing indefinite repetitions of the single game. Multiple games allow players to
observe past behavior and to condition their choices on their opponent's prior actions.
If players believe that the current iteration is not the last, they may base their choice
not only on the immediate payoff, but also on the expected effect of their choice on
the other player's later moves. The choice about how to react to past moves
constitutes a strategy. Some strategies may perform better than others. The famous
instance concerns the tit-for-tat strategy in the context of certain defection games, in
particular the Prisoners' Dilemma. Given sufficiently high discount factors (relative
indifference between present and future outcomes), the tit-for-tat strategy leads to
outcomes that mimic what would happen if parties could bargain explicitly.'2
More recently, evolutionary game theory has refined the analysis of multiple-
iteration games." Borrowing on insights from theoretical biology, this methodology
looks at the adaptive success of various strategies under conditions of mutability
(some predictable number of players change their strategies between iterations) and
discounting of future results (due to uncertainty about whether future iterations
occur, uncertainty about the value of future payoffs, and the reduced time value of
future payoffs). The principal insight of this literature is to put boundaries on the
claim that iteration increases the likelihood of success for strategies that promote
10. The Prisoners' Dilemma is the most famous defection problem, at least in the international relations
literature, but another, the Chicken Game (also called Dove-Hawk) also has received some
treatment. In the Prisoners' Dilemma, X prefers (B,A) to all other outcomes and regards (A,B) as
the worst result, and Y prefers (A,B) and regards (B,A) as the worst outcome. Both regard (A,A) as
their second most preferred outcome. In the Chicken Game, both regard (B,B) as the worst
outcome and (A,A) as their second most preferred outcome.
11. Coordination games do not eliminate all opportunity costs. In the battle of the sexes, for example,
players prefer different matching outcomes, so the choice of either match ((A,A) or (B,B)) imposes
opportunity costs on one player. But both players are better off under either match than they would
be under either non-matching outcome. In the stag hunt one match presents opportunity costs for
both players compared to the optimal match, and each player may prefer defection to the lower-
valued match.
12. For treatment of multiple-iteration games, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic
Books 1984). For the application of Axelrod's treatment to international relations theory, see Snidal,
79 Am Polit Sci Rev 923 (cited in note 7); Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in
Kenneth A. Oye, ed, Cooperation Under Anarchy 25 (Princeton 1986).
13. On evolutionary game theory as it applies to custom and law, see Paul G. Mahoney and Chris W.
Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U Pa L Rev 2027
(2001).
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beneficial cooperation. Under certain realistic conditions, iteration will lead to
strategies that stabilize around suboptimal outcomes. The likelihood of suboptimal
survivability increases with mismatch cost (the difference in the payout to each player
between PBA and PB) and the discount rate, and decreases with efficiency gain (the
payout difference for each player between P, and P, )."
A numerical example illustrates the insight of evolutionary game theory.
Working with the familiar Prisoners' Dilemma, assume that Player X has a gain of 5
if both X and Y choose strategy A, -10 if X chooses A and Y chooses B, 10 if X
chooses B and Y chooses A, and 0 if both choose B. Assume that Y's payoffs mirror
X's (where X gets -10, Y gets 10, and vice versa). The optimal outcome occurs when
both choose A; all other outcomes, summing together each player's return, produce a
net payoff of 0. If the game involves an indefinite number of iterations and X reliably
knows that Y invariably will pursue a tit-for-tat strategy, X must choose between B (a
payoff of 10 followed by an indefinite string of 0 payoffs) and A (an indefinite string
of 5 payoffs). X will prefer the choice of A as long as X's discount factor is greater
than 0.5.
Assume to the contrary that Y has the capacity to switch strategies at any stage
of the game, making prediction of Y's responses to X's choices impossible. X will
choose A only if the discount factor is 0.75 or higher, which implies a discount rate of
33 percent or less. The combination of some pessimism about the future, the high cost
of choosing a different outcome from one's opponent, and the relatively low reward,
compared to the mismatch cost, from matching the opponent at the more efficient
outcome, makes the fittest strategy, in evolutionary terms, one that produces
inefficient outcomes.
It is impossible to state categorically that defection games will have higher
mismatch costs, relative to efficiency gains, than will coordination games. The so-
called chicken game, in which the players prefer a successful mismatch to the best
match and least prefer the wrong match, may produce great efficiency gains. A
conventional example is the Cold War's nuclear balance of terror, or Mutually
Assured Destruction. While either side might have preferred defeat of its enemy to
the status quo of the Cold War, stalemate clearly produced welfare gains as compared
to mutual nuclear annihilation. Conversely, some coordination gains may have high
mismatch risk relative to welfare gains. The so-called stag hunt, where a player may be
indifferent between the right mismatch and the low match and least prefers the wrong
14. Id at 2057 (giving formula). Simplifying the formula, we can state that inefficient outcomes will be
fit in the evolutionary sense whenever MR-EG > w, where MR = mismatch risk, EG = efficiency
gains, and w is the discount factor, expressing the degree of confidence in the future (or more
precisely, 1 divided by 1 plus the discount rate r).
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mismatch, can meet these conditions even though, ex definitio, the players prefer the
right match to any mismatch.15
Nonetheless some generalizations are possible. The particular coordination game
known as the Prisoners' Dilemma by definition has high mismatch costs relative to
efficiency gains. In this game, the right mismatch is the most desired outcome, and the
wrong mismatch the least. The difference between mismatch outcomes thus must
always exceed the difference between the good and bad match. The point is not that,
under evolutionary conditions, games that conform to the Prisoners' Dilemma model
will lead to suboptimal outcomes. The possibility of efficient outcomes achieving
evolutionary fitness depends critically on the discount rate. But, relative to other
coordination and defection games, the Prisoners' Dilemma is more likely to lead to
inefficient outcomes even at lower discount rates.
These refinements have significant implications for international relations
generally, and law unification projects in particular. First, an assumption of a
somewhat high discount rate seems plausible. Many factors impede the ability of
states to maintain stable interactions with others. States may have indefinite lives and
therefore significant continuity, but governments and regimes do not. The population
of policy 6lites turns over, even where the structures of 6lite decisionmaking endure.
The needs and impulses of electorates, to which at least some 6lite decisionmakers are
accountable, also change over time. The complexity of the environment in which they
can operate, where there is a wide range of policy choices, rather than the bimodal
choice modeled in classical game theory, adds to uncertainty about outcomes.
In law unification projects, the assumption of a higher discount rate seems
especially plausible. Legal unification typically occurs in the context of a particular
industry or economic sector, where the legal regime both depends on and to some
degree determines the underlying transactional structure. These environments can
change significantly in light of shifting supply capacities, consumer demand and
technological innovation. Alteration in the underlying economic conditions in turn
can create new groups of winners and losers, with corresponding shifts in what they
want from the law. In the next section I identify several law unification projects that
operate under exactly these conditions.
Application of the remaining insights of evolutionary game theory to law
unification projects cannot be straightforward. Some unification efforts occur in fields
that have the characteristics of a pure coordination game, where each player is
indifferent between mismatches and prefers only some match. Where transactors can
expect to be on either side, such as sales between merchants, we might anticipate
mutual willingness to embrace rules that reduce uncertainty and that have no
apparent distributional effect (for example, the detailed definition of "free on board"
15. For a demonstration of this point, see id at 2044-47.
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found in the International Chamber of Commerces Incoterms).' Once a norm
emerges under these conditions, we would expect a broad consensus in its support,
encompassing adjudicators as well as transactors.
In other areas, however, law unification seeks to restrict the rights of a well
defined group of transactors in pursuit of general welfare. Regulatory programs of this
type qualify as redistributive in the precise sense that certain transactors lose rights
and powers that they value. The program may generate welfare gains, and the group
suffering losses might receive some compensation, but the concrete losses remain an
opportunity cost for the persons affected.
In these cases the Prisoners' Dilemma becomes the appropriate model. An
example is the severely constraining rules applicable to French winegrowers operating
under the Appellation d'origine Contr6l6e ("AOC") rules, which restrict individual
flexibility to promote brand quality. Driving the quality of the brand upwards involves
substantial sacrifices by the individual grower, who must adopt more costly
production methods and forego production increases. Mismatch gains and losses can
be great: Producing costly wine while others are adulterating generates relative losses,
while adulterating a brand that everyone else maintains leads to considerable gains.
We would not expect a high-quality unified standard to evolve without centralized
enforcement.
1 7
These insights extend to adjudicators, not just to predictions as to the content of
unified law. First, under conditions where we would anticipate difficulty creating
optimal unified rules, we also would expect national courts not to reach a consensus as
to the optimal interpretation and application of these rules. The dispersion approach,
in other words, would not achieve desirable unification. Second, under the same
conditions, we would expect a centralized dispute resolution system also to have
difficulty maintaining consistent adherence to optimal interpretation and application
of these rules. The centralized adjudicatory body might achieve coherence over the
short run, but over time it would tend to cycle its outcomes and otherwise respond to
shifting preferences on the part of powerful states. In the next section, I offer some
examples of international unification projects that illustrate these pitfalls.
16. For discussion of transactor reversibility as a condition of successful law unification, see Robert E.
Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 63 La L Rev (forthcoming 2002). See also Saul Levmore, Variety
and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J Legal Stud 43 (1987) (documenting
evolutionary fitness of "thou shalt nor steal" as a norm and of the lack of fitness of any particular
norm governing good-faith purchasers of misappropriated goods).
17. Staying with the example of AOC wines, it is instructive to compare the meaning of terms such as
"Champagne," "Chablis," or "Burgundy" as applied to controlled French production, with the uses of
these labels in the United States.
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III. REDISTRIBUTIVE UNIFICATION: SOME EXAMPLES
Modern experience with international legal unification began over a century ago.
The initial projects involved international shipment of goods, and commercial
transactions remain at the heart of these efforts. More recent efforts, involving
proposals rather than realized achievements, seek to harmonize regulation of business
activities. Most of these efforts have contained significant redistributive goals. As the
following section indicates, those projects that have come to pass have not achieved
anything like full legal unification. The regulatory proposals hold out even less
promise of success.
A. CARRIAGE OF GOODS
International unification of the law governing the transport of goods illustrates
the shortcoming of the dispersion approach. The story begins at the end of the
nineteenth century, when a handful of sea carriers had organized a cartel covering
Atlantic routes. The cartel generated profits through monopolistic pricing and used
standardized bills of lading, supported by the English law of contract, to immunize
carriers from a wide array of risks affecting cargo. In response, individual states began
to regulate the terms of shipping contracts, including those governing liability for
accidents. The industry responded with the project that culminated in the 1924
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading,
popularly known as the Hague Rules. 8
Close on the heels of the Hague Rules came efforts by the nascent air transport
industry to achieve a similar unified contractual structure. With the Hague Rules
serving as a model, the industry began negotiations in 1922 that led to the Warsaw
Convention in 1929. The United States, which after World War I had become the
preeminent international economic power, joined the unified air transport club in
1934, two years before it adopted the Hague Rules.'9
These regimes for international sea and air transport have functional as well as
formal similarities. First, both are redistributive. Second, both have seen significant
defections from the unification goals. Third, both rely on national courts for
18. For more of the background and content of the Hague Rules, see Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of
Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VaJ Intl L 743,762-68 (1999).
19. Id at 768-72. For those interested in lawmaking processes, and in particular the rather esoteric
debate about the legitimacy under the US Constitution of so-called congressional-executive
agreements, it is worth noting that the United States adopted the Warsaw Convention through the
Article II treaty process, and two years later, with no change in Congress or the Administration,
enacted the virtually identical Hague Rules as a statute, the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act. See Joel
Richard Paul, Is Global Governance Safe for Democracy?, 1 Chi J Intl L 263, 268-70 (2000) (reviewing
debate).
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interpretation and enforcement, a choice that has led to greater discrepancies among
states with regard to the "unified" law.
The redistributive nature of the Hague Rules and the Warsaw Convention
seems clear, although the direction of the redistribution is debatable. The issue is
choosing the right baseline. Both laws set limits on the ability of shippers to exonerate
carriers for certain kinds of liability for damage to cargo. Both authorize other kinds of
limitations on liability, in particular caps on damages, which in a standardized-form
contracting environment comes close to stipulating these limits. The English common
law of the late nineteenth century permitted and enforced full exoneration, so from
this perspective the unified laws took away valuable rights from carriers. On the other
hand, important states, particularly the United States, had already enacted restrictions
on carriers' freedom of contract. From this perspective, the unified laws arguably held
off other, more draconian restrictions on carrier rights. Both regimes also preclude
"budgee' carriers from competing on the basis of lower levels of service, a strategy that
often is associated with industry cartelization." What seems non-debatable, however,
is that both laws mediate between two classes of discrete transactors with substantial
opposing interests-sellers of shipping services and their customers.
These regimes also illustrate the use of the dispersion strategy with respect to
enforcement. The parties to the two conventions enacted the same words as governing
law, but no centralized body currently ensures consistent application and
interpretation. Nations may modify the unified law to meet the particular interests of
groups within their jurisdiction, and nothing stops their courts from doing the same.
Thus, for example, Australia and South Africa enacted a version of the Hague Rules
that arguably favors consumers at the expense of service providers, compared to the
baseline of the Convention.2' In addition, competing regimes-the Visby and
Hamburg Rules in sea carriage, and the Hague and Montreal Protocols in air
carriage-have proliferated, ending even the formal unity of the nations that initially
embraced the Hague and Warsaw projects. 22
National courts have made a significant contribution to the conflicting meaning
of these laws. They disagree on questions such as the liability of servants and
contractors of the carrier, the compensability of intangible injuries, and the extent of
the obligation of carriers to inform customers of liability limitations.23 The separation
20. Stephan, 39 VaJ Intl L at 764-66,771-72 (cited in note 18).
21. Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1924, § 9(2) (Australia); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, No. 1 of 1986, §
3 (South Africa) (forbidding choice-of-forum clauses in carriage contracts). One suspects that in
both countries, consumers of sea shipping services play an important part in the economy but that
ownership of major carriers is located elsewhere.
22. Stephan, 39 VaJ Ind L at 765-66,770-71 & nn 37,40 (cited in note 18).
23. For discussion and dose analysis of cases reaching conflicting interpretations of the Hague Rules,
see Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in
Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 Va J Intl L 729 (1987). For US cases disregarding or marginalizing
Fall 2002
Stepban
Cbicagojournafof International Law
of outcomes led the preeminent US commentator on the Hague Rules to call for the
creation of an international court of appeals to impose uniformity.",
Has the breakdown in the uniformity of these laws caused significant welfare
losses? The behavior of transactors suggests that the status quo provided by dispersed
adjudicators does not meet their needs. At least for sea carriage, transactors have
invested in the design and enforcement of contracts that work around the divergent
approaches of adjudicatory bodies. Carriers often insert choice-of-forum clauses,
including arbitration clauses, in their form contracts, which courts in turn honor.'
Transactors, in other words, have obtained the benefits of uniformity through
contract, not by legislative fiat.
B. ANTITRUST
In theory, international competition policy should be seamless. The harmful
effects of monopolization and cartelization on consumer welfare are well understood
and generally recognized, even if particular industrial structures remain controversial
because of offsetting benefits due to specialization, economies of scale, and related
factors. Governments often sacrifice consumer welfare for other ends (protection of
locally favored producers, industrial policy and the like), but one would think that
competition law would be the one arrow in states' regulatory quivers that governments
would employ unambiguously to make consumers better off through the promotion
of more efficient markets. If welfare goals explained competition policy, we would
expect variation in the degree of commitment, but not in the policy's content.
What we find, however, is strikingly different economic, social, and political
norms embedded in national competition policies. In the EU, competition law focuses
upon attacking large concentrations of economic power (especially, it must be noted,
when those concentrations are not located in Europe). In the United States, the
administrative authorities (although not necessarily the courts) show greater
sympathy for the offsetting economic benefits of large structures, but seem uniquely
willing to regulate the level of competition in foreign markets (where US producers
allegedly face export barriers). At the risk of oversimplification, two generalizations
seem true: EU competition policy, compared to that of the United States, focuses
more on the political risks to the state from concentrated economic power; and both
foreign interpretations of the Warsaw Convention, see, for example, Zicberman v Korean Air Lines,
516 US 217 (1996); Eastern Airlines v Floyd, 499 US 530 (1991); Cban v Korean Air Lines, 490 US 122
(1989).
24. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of Conflicting Interpretation, 6 Vand J
Transnatl L 365 (1973).
25. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, SA v M/V Sky Reefer, 515 US 528 (1995) (arbitration); The Bremen v
Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 US 1 (1972) (London Court ofJustice).
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regimes invoke competition rules to achieve objectives that seem largely rooted in
trade policy and unrelated, or even adverse, to consumer welfare.
The blurring of competition and trade policy is especially troubling for anyone
who would wish to see general norms of competition law at work internationally.
Common national practice has called off restraint of trade rules in instances where
monopoly rents to local producers could be derived from foreign consumers.'
Strategic trade theory offers a rationale for such practices. It argues that under the
right conditions, the benefits from cartelization will include positive externalities for
other sectors in the national economy at a level that exceeds the welfare loss to local
consumers due to reduced competition.
These different approaches to competition law necessarily have different
distributive effects. A theoretically pure competition regime (that is, one seeking
simply to maximize consumer welfare) would entail wealth redistribution. By
definition, this would end producers' monopoly rents to the benefit of consumers.
Mixed regimes, especially as seen in Europe and Japan, facilitate the collection of
monopoly rents by some producers at the expense of others, and of consumers. And
the use of competition law to achieve trade goals normally involves the promotion of
the interests of domestic producers, at the cost of both domestic consumers and
foreign producers.
The sharpest contrast between US and other nations' competition law involves
the role of the courts. In Europe and Japan, civil suits brought by victims of anti-
competitive conduct play almost no role in shaping the content of the law. In Europe,
enforcement rests largely in the European Commission, with some national
competition authorities policing local markets. Japan takes a similar approach, except
that its administrative authorities do less than their European counterparts. In both
systems the courts find their role limited to reviewing the propriety of actions brought
by the government, a review that generally reflects the judges' deference toward the
administrators.
In the United States, by contrast, civil litigation plays a significant role in shaping
the content as well as the enforcement of antitrust law. The capacious statutory
language invites judicial freelancing, an invitation that the courts have accepted with
gusto. But judicial discretion has not produced a stable, ever more precisely refined
system of rules. Rather, the courts have oscillated between per se rules and rules of
reason to determine the acceptability of particular practices, such as vertical restraints,
tie-ins, and boycotts. Populist interpretation has given way to economically driven
welfare considerations, with no stable consensus across time. The administrative
26. In the United States, examples include the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, codified at 15 USC
§§ 61-65 (exempting registered exporters' marketing cartels from antitrust regulation); National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984, codified at 15 USC §§ 4301 et seq (exempting cooperative
research projects).
Fall 2002
Step[Jan
CbicagoJournalof Internationa(Law
agencies have done what they can to follow in the courts' wake, but their role in
defining the law can go no further than what the courts will permit.
Add to this interpretative freedom the characteristics that generally attach to US
civil litigation-class actions, contingency fees, and generous pretrial discovery-and
private lawsuits take on an even greater economic significance. In an international
context, what matters is the asymmetry between these court-dominated aspects of the
US system and the administrative-agency regimes that prevail elsewhere, especially in
Europe. The mismatch makes any collaborative efforts that bind only administrative
agencies, such as the current accord between the EU and the US Department of
Justice, seriously incomplete.
Perhaps because of the inherent limitations of prior efforts to coordinate
competition law, the principal economic powers worked to have the latest round of
WTO negotiations consider a proposal to submit national competition policy to
WTO review. The language of the Doha Declaration is deliberately vague. It does
not refer to any particular mechanism for implementing this review, much less
defining its objectives."8 Nonetheless, the inclusion of the topic of competition policy,
however innocuous the phrasing, suggests a certain inevitability about the process. It
does not seem excessively speculative to envision a future where the WTO will have
the authority to police national compliance with certain uniform standards, much as it
does now with respect to intellectual property law. 9
A review of past WTO practice in reviewing national legal practice relating to
competition policy illustrates the deficiencies of the centralized approach, at least
using the present institutional architecture. In one instance, Japan-Measures Affecting
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, the WTO showed itself unable to process a
claim by the United States that nonenforcement of Japanese competition law reflected
a government strategy of protecting local producers from foreign, i.e. US,
competition.' The Japanese laws themselves mandated no discrimination against
imports, and the WTO refused to look behind the laws' formal requirements to
27. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference - Fourth Session - Doha, 9-14 November 2001 -
Ministerial Declaration - Adopted on 14 November 2001, WTO Doc No WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov
20, 2001) (hereinafter Doha Declaration).
28. The key language, found in paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration, refers to "core principles,
including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore
cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building." Id.
29. For an optimistic vision of how the WTO might do this, see Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and
International Regulatory Federalism, 76 NYU L Rev 1142 (2001). For my skepticism about this, see
Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 Georgetown Lj 957,961-64 (2002).
30. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc No WT/DS44/R (Mar 31, 1998). For a more extensive
discussion of this dispute, see Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World
Trade Organization, 1 ChiJ Intl L 49, 56-61 (2000).
VoL. 3 W. 2
Courts, Tri6unafs, andLegal Unification-The ..Agency Pro6lem
discern a concerted policy in administrative and judicial decisionmaking. In another,
United States-Antidumping Act of 1916, the WTO ruled that an old US statute
violated trade law because it provided for the theoretical possibility of private
enforcement of antidumping rules.3 The WTO regarded as irrelevant that the US
judiciary had interpreted the statute so narrowly as to preclude its application to any
set of facts that would not constitute a criminal breach of the Sherman Act. These
disputes illustrate the WTO's inability to account for the capacity of domestic courts
to alter the effect of generally applicable laws, either to imbue them with a bias against
foreign producers (as in the Japanese case) or to interpret them to remove such a bias
(as in the Antidumping Act of 1916).
Nor does it seem likely that the WTO, or any other body, will find it possible to
consider the effect of judicial policy on the meaning and application of regulatory
regimes. Part of the problem is the difficulty of coping simultaneously with judicial
policy expressed through cryptic decisions that depend on authoritative but unofficial
interpreters (as in civil law countries) and the verbose, sometimes incoherent offerings
of common law courts. Both strategies shape the law in ways that the naked language
of statutes may not suggest, but developing a full and faithful appreciation of each
presents extraordinary difficulties.
In theory, the WTO might address this problem by engaging in case-by-case
review of judicial outcomes in the manner of the European Court of Justice in the
European Union or the Supreme Court in the United States. Hypothetically,
domestic policies expressed through inaction (as in the Japanese film case) might then
be subjected to some oversight. But the thought of replicating these judicial bodies at
the international level raises grave concerns about accountability, consistency, and
predictability. No one has proposed offering anything like Article III life tenure to the
participants in the WTO's dispute resolution procedure, and the arguments against
such a step are manifest. Yet it seems unlikely that arbiters who serve largely at the
pleasure of significant national actors will be able to develop a coherent jurisprudence
that significantly constrains the capacity of domestic courts to shape the content of
competition policy.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Like competition law, environmental law addresses conflicts between the
preferences of producers and those of society as a whole. Unlike competition law,
environmental law sets against producer interests a wide array of social concerns and
desires, not merely the conceptually simple, if sometimes empirically elusive, criterion
31. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Antidumping Act of 1916,
WTO Doc Nos WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug 28,2000).
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of consumer welfare. It has, in short, all of the redistributive effects of competition
law, multiplied by a greater range ofjustifications for regulating producer behavior.
I know of no efforts at present to impose a unified law of environmental
protection. Given what we know about preferences for environmental protection, this
absence hardly seems surprising. Considerable empirical work indicates that a strong
positive correlation exists between prosperity and a desire for a safer and more
attractive environment; the correlation applies both to individuals and to states. One
would be surprised not to find radical differences among states in terms of what they
would forego for a cleaner environment, as a wide disparity exists among states with
regard to their well-being, whether measured narrowly in terms of GDP or broadly to
include social capital. These differences make national enforcement of uniform
standards implausible.
Some experiments with centralized harmonization exist, although none currently
in existence has tested how adjudication might work. But we do observe centralized
unification in the symmetrical area of WTO-based trade law, which may constrain
the kinds of environmental rules nations can adopt. What is intriguing about the
interaction of trade and environmental law at the WTO is the complicating role of
national judicial behavior.
The most important WTO case involves US restrictions on shrimp imports
designed to protect endangered sea turtles from accidental harvesting." After
mandating in 1987 the use of turtle exclusion devices ("TEDs") for shrimp nets
employed in US waters, Congress in 1990 banned the importation of all shrimp not
harvested with TEDs. Over the next decade, environmentalists, the US government,
the US courts, and the WTO disputed the meaning and extent of this statute.
The WTO Appellate Body determined that the United States had the right
under the WTO regime to regulate the conditions of shrimp harvesting in foreign
waters, but ruled that the regulations adopted by the Department of Commerce
constituted an impermissibly arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of that regulatory
power. The tribunal regarded as irrelevant that the regulations only technically
represented the position of the executive branch. The government had adopted them
only in response to a court order based on an interpretation of the statute with which
it disagreed. In reaction to the WTO ruling, the US government in effect reinstated
its prior interpretation of the law, one that removed the aspects that the WTO found
offensive. The Court of International Trade ruled that the new regulations violated
the congressional mandate, but on appeal the Federal Circuit reversed.33
32. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Probibitions of
Certain Sbrimp and Sbrimp Products, VTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998).
33. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v Evans, 284 F3d 1282 (Fed Cir 2002). The precise issues were
(1) whether the ban affected shrimp from all nations, or only those from fisheries near the United
States, and (2) whether the statute banned all shrimp originating from countries that did not
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For our purposes, the interesting question is not which actor correctly divined
the intent of Congress, but rather which interpretation constituted the "law" of the
United States for purposes of assessing its compliance with its international
obligations. In one sense, the WTO took a consistent position-it regarded the US
position as whatever its administrative regulations provided. In doing so, it regarded as
irrelevant whether those regulations reflected judicial demands with which the
government disagreed (as they did between 1995 and 1999) or whether the regulations
conflicted with what the judiciary had divined to be the intent of Congress (as they
did between 1999 and 2002). For purposes of centralized supervision of international
unification, the domestic system of checks and balances disappears, to be replaced
with an artificial depiction of a monolithic national position.
A legal fiction of national legal homogeneity serves the purposes of simplifying
the task of international supervision and increasing the accountability of the
institution in direct contact with the supervising entity, namely the executive branch
of government. This fiction, however, not only sacrifices realism-although some
nations may not have genuine separation of powers, others have a highly meaningful
system of divided government-but it privileges the executive branch at the expense
of the others. This highlights an additional cost of centralized unification, namely the
incremental loss of political accountability through legislative oversight in favor of
greater concentration of administrative power. Moreover, because executive branches,
compared to legislatures and the judiciary, generally face lower barriers to sudden
shifts in policy, the fiction increases the likelihood of instability in national
commitments to nominal unification of regulatory principles.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a world where the solution to defection problems involves sacrifices by nations
and interest groups, with only an uncertain prospect of compensation, many forces
will undercut the effort to impose a cooperative solution. Political scientists and
international lawyers have assumed the existence of foot-dragging and resistance by
nation states. They have not fully considered the resistance by sub-national interest
groups, and have not considered resistance expressed through adjudicatory bodies at
all. Yet both theory and casual empiricism indicate that this resistance can be a serious
problem.
Evolutionary game theory provides one means of formalizing insights about this
resistance. The theory not only predicts the fitness of formally noncooperative
outcomes, but also explains why states might tolerate a world in which nations
mandate the use of TEDs, or only shrimp harvested by ships that did not use TEDs. The Appellate
Body maintained that the United States could require the use of TEDs, but had to apply this
requirement on a ship-by-ship, rather than country-by-country, basis.
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consent to formal legal unification while permitting either national courts (in the case
of the dispersion approach to unification) or international bodies (in the case of the
centralized approach) to undermine the nominal cooperative outcome. The theory
both confirms the lack of significant legal unification in a wide array of areas affected
by global economic forces and suggests that hopes of achieving significant gains in
these areas are illusory.
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